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Abstract. The vulnerability of the Internet has been demonstrated by
prominent IP prefix hijacking events. Major outages such as the China
Telecom incident in 2010 stimulate speculations about malicious inten-
tions behind such anomalies. Surprisingly, almost all discussions in the
current literature assume that hijacking incidents are enabled by the lack
of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol BGP.
In this paper, we discuss an attacker model that accounts for the hi-
jacking of network ownership information stored in Regional Internet
Registry (RIR) databases. We show that such threats emerge from aban-
doned Internet resources (e.g., IP address blocks, AS numbers). When
DNS names expire, attackers gain the opportunity to take resource own-
ership by re-registering domain names that are referenced by correspond-
ing RIR database objects. We argue that this kind of attack is more
attractive than conventional hijacking, since the attacker can act in full
anonymity on behalf of a victim. Despite corresponding incidents have
been observed in the past, current detection techniques are not qualified
to deal with these attacks. We show that they are feasible with very little
effort, and analyze the risk potential of abandoned Internet resources for
the European service region: our findings reveal that currently 73 /24
IP prefixes and 7 ASes are vulnerable to be stealthily abused. We dis-
cuss countermeasures and outline research directions towards preventive
solutions.
1 Introduction
Internet resources today are assigned by five Regional Internet Registrars (RIRs).
These non-profit organisations are responsible for resources such as blocks of
IP addresses or numbers for autonomous systems (ASes). Information about
the status of such resources is maintained in publicly accessible RIR databases,
which are frequently used by upstream providers to verify ownership for customer
networks. In general, networks are vulnerable to be hijacked by attackers due to
the inherent lack of security mechanisms in the inter-domain routing protocol
BGP. Real attacks have been observed in the past that led to the development of
a variety of detection techniques and eventually of security extensions to BGP
[8,11]. Common to these attacks is a malicious claim of IP resources at the
routing layer. However, claims of network ownership can be also made at RIR
level, a fact that has received little attention so far.
In a history of more than three decades, a vast number of Internet resources
have been handed out to numerous users under varying assignment policies. Some
ASes or prefixes have never been actively used in the inter-domain routing, others
changed or lost their original purpose when companies merged or vanished. It
is not surprising that some Internet resources became abandoned, i.e. resource
holders ceased to use and maintain their resources.
In this paper, we focus on threats that emerge from abandoned Internet
resources. Currently, there is no mechanism that provides resource ownership
validation of registered stakeholders. Instead, the control over email addresses
that are stored with RIR database objects is often considered a proof of owner-
ship for the corresponding resources. Our contribution is a generalized attacker
model that takes into account these shortcomings. We thoroughly evaluate the
risk potential introduced by this attack by drawing on several data sources, and
show that the threat is real. Since this kind of attack enables an attacker to fully
hide his identity, it makes hijacking more attractive, and significantly harder to
disclose. Consequently, we show that state-of-the-art detection techniques based
on network measurements are ill-suited to deal with such attacks. Even so, these
attacks have been evidenced in practice, and should thus be taken into account
by future research.
We continue the discussion by establishing our attacker model in Section 2.
In Section 3, we estimate the risk potential of abandoned resources, and show
that there is a real threat. As a result, we outline an approach to mitigate this
threat, and discuss limitations of related work in Section 4. In particular, we
outline the need for a system that provides resource ownership validation. We
conclude our discussion in Section 5.
2 Attacker Model
Conventional attacks on BGP are based on its lack of origin validation, which
allows an attacker to originate arbitrary prefixes or specific subnets from his own
AS. We propose a new attacker model that accounts for attackers to take own-
ership of abandoned resources. In such a scenario, an attacker is able to act on
behalf of his victim, in particular to arrange upstream connectivity. Misled up-
stream providers unknowingly connect one or several ASes including prefixes of
the victims as instructed by an attacker who successfully hides his true identity.
Following this model, the anonymous attacker can participate in the cooperative
Internet exchange at arbitrary places without any formal incorrectness. In the
following, we generalize a real incident to derive preconditions that enable this
kind of attack.
2.1 Background: The LinkTel Incident
In previous work [17], a corresponding attack has been observed in practice,
which is known as the LinkTel incident. The authors studied this attack and
showed that a victim’s prefixes originated from his own AS, while the victim
itself abandoned his business. The authors reconstructed the attacker’s course
of action to claim ownership of the abandoned resources. The LinkTel incident
thereby revealed a major flaw in the Internet eco-system: validation of resource
ownership is most often based on manual inspection of RIR databases. In this
context, it was shown that the attacker was able to gain control over the vic-
tim’s DNS domain, and thus over corresponding email addresses. The involved
upstream provider presumably validated that the attacker’s email address was
referenced by the hijacked resources’ RIR database objects. Given this proof of
ownership, the upstream provider was convinced by the attacker’s claim to be
the legitimate holder of the resources. Surprisingly, the attacker captured the
victim’s DNS domain by simply re-registering it after expiration.
For several months, the attacker’s abuse of the hijacked resources remained
unnoticed. By combining several data sources, the authors showed that the hi-
jacked networks were utilized to send spam, to host web sites that advertised
disputable products, and to engage in IRC communication. After the victim
recovered his business, he learned that his networks were listed on spamming
blacklists. However, the attacker’s upstream provider refused to take action at
first, since the victim was unable to refute the attacker’s ownership claims.
2.2 Preconditions for an Attack
Based on the insights gained from the LinkTel incident, we show that the at-
tacker’s approach can be generalized. To enable hijacking of Internet resources,
the following preconditions have to be met: (a) Internet resources are evidentially
abandoned and (b) the original resource holder can be impersonated.
If an organisation goes out of business in an unsorted manner, these condi-
tions are eventually met. As a first consequence, the organisation ceases to use
and maintain its resources. If this situation lasts over a longer period of time,
the organisation’s domain name(s) expire. Since day-to-day business lies idle,
re-registration and thus impersonation becomes practicable for an attacker. At
that moment, upstream connectivity can be arranged on behalf of the victim,
since face-to-face communication is not required in general. Routers can be sent
via postal service, or even be rented on a virtualized basis. Details on BGP and
network configuration are usually exchanged via email, IRC, or cellular phone,
and payment can be arranged anonymously by bank deposits or other suitable
payment instruments. Without revealing any evidence about his real identity,
the attacker is able to stealthily hijack and deploy the abandoned resources.
2.3 Implications
The implications of this attacker model are manifold. First, an attacker may act
on behalf of a victim, thereby effectively hiding his own identity and impeding
disclosure. This makes hijacking more attractive as it enables riskless network
abuse. It hinders criminal prosecution, and could be used to deliberately create
tensions between organisations or even countries. Due to the lack of a system
for resource ownership validation, these attacks only depend on idle organisa-
tions or missing care by legal successors of terminated businesses. Even after the
discovery of such an attack, it is difficult for the victim to mitigate since reclaim-
ing ownership is the word of one person against another at first. The LinkTel
incident [17] proves that this is not only a realistic scenario: such attacks are
actually carried out in practice.
The benefit of attacks based on abandoned resources can even be higher
than in the case of conventional attacks. Hijacking productive networks rarely
lasts for more than a few hours, since the victim can receive great support
in mitigating the attack. Moreover, for most cases, the benefit is reduced to
blackholing a victim’s network – with the Youtube-Pakistan incident being a
prominent example. In addition, monitoring systems for network operators exist
that raise alarms for unexpected announcements of their prefixes. However, due
to the very nature of abandoned resources, virtually no one is going to take
notice of an attack. Our attacker model thus accounts for stealthily operating
attackers who aim at persistently maintaining malicious services.
3 Abandoned Internet Resources
We identify readily hijackable Internet resources by searching RIR databases for
unmaintained resource objects. Subsequently, we distinguish between resources
that are still in use, with potential for network disruption, and resources that
are fully abandoned and ready to be abused stealthily. Such resources are es-
pecially attractive for attackers for two reasons. First, the resource is assigned
to an organisation for operational use and thus represents a valid resource in
the Internet routing system. Second, an attacker can easily claim ownership by
taking control of the contact address referenced by corresponding RIR database
objects, ie˙b˙y re-registering a domain name.
Consequently, we look for RIR database objects that reference email ad-
dresses with expired DNS names. Since the inference of invalid domain names
can also be the result of poorly maintained resource objects or typing errors, it is
important to take into account recent database activities for individual resource
owners, and to correlate this information with BGP activity.
The following analysis is based on archived RIPE database snapshots over
2.5 years (23 February, 2012 till 9 July, 2014). Our results are representative for
the European service region only, but similar analyses can be done with little
effort for other service regions, too.
Object type Frequency DNS references
inetnum 3,876,883 1,350,537 (34.84%)
domain 658,689 97,557 (14.81%)
route 237,370 50,300 (21.19%)
inet6num 231,355 8,717 (3.77%)
organisation 82,512 0 (0.00%)
mntner 48,802 0 (0.00%)
aut-num 27,683 6,838 (24.70%)
role 20,684 14,430 (69.76%)
as-set 13,655 2,500 (18.31%)
route6 9,660 723 (7.48%)
irt 321 162 (50.47%)
Total 5,239,201 1,531,764 (29.24%)
Table 1. Data objects stored in the RIPE database, and references to DNS names.
9 July, 2014.
3.1 Resource Candidates from RIR Database
RIPE, like all other RIRs, provides publicly available database snapshots on a
daily basis. Most of the personally related information is removed due to privacy
concerns. Some attributes, however, remain unanonymized, which we utilize to
extract DNS names.
Available Data Objects The RIPE database holds more than 5.2 million ob-
jects. These objects can be updated from the Web or via email. Most of these
objects optionally hold an email address in the notify field, to which corre-
sponding update notifications are sent. Despite anonymization, we found that
these notify fields are preserved in the publicly available database snapshots,
which is also the case for abuse-mailbox attributes. To extract DNS names, we
parse these email addresses where applicable.
Table 1 shows the distribution of stored objects by type along with the num-
ber of DNS names we were able to extract. Although we found more than 1.5
million references to DNS names, the total number of distinct names is only
21,061. This implies that, on average, more than 72 objects reference the same
DNS name. The overall fraction of objects that reference a domain name is
29.24%, which is surprisingly high since the database snapshots are considered
to be anonymized.
Hijackable Internet resources are given by inetnum and aut-num objects,
which represent blocks of IP addresses and unique numbers for autonomous sys-
tems respectively. Exemplary database objects are provided in Figure 1, further
details on the RIPE database model and update procedures are available at [16].
It is worth noting that the attacker neither needs authenticated access to
the database nor does the attacker need to change the database objects. The
inetnum: 194.28.196.0 - 194.28.199.255
netname: UA-VELES
descr: LLC "Unlimited Telecom"
descr: Kyiv
notify: internet@veles-isp.com.ua
mnt-by: VELES-MNT
aut-num: AS51016
as-name: VALES
descr: LLC "Unlimited Telecom"
notify: internet@veles-isp.com.ua
mnt-by: VELES-MNT
Fig. 1. Examples of RIPE database objects (inetnum and aut-num objects).
attacker only needs to derive a valid contact point. We assume that the (publicly
available) notification address usually belongs to the same DNS domain as the
technical contact point. Detailed analysis is subject to future work; in our study,
we disregard groups of objects that reference more than a single DNS domain
as a precaution.
Grouping Objects by Maintainer The RIPE database is mostly maintained
by resource holders themselves. Its security model is based on references to
mntner (maintainer) objects, which grant update and delete privileges to the
person holding a mntner object’s password. This security model allows us to
infer objects under control of the same authority by grouping objects with refer-
ences to a common mntner object. We use these maintainer groups to estimate
the impact of an attack for individual authorities: On average, we observed
nearly 110 such references per mntner object, with a maximum of up to 436,558
references4. The distribution of the number of objects per maintainer group is
presented in Figure 2.
For each of the maintainer groups, we obtain the set of all DNS names refer-
enced by a group’s objects. To unambiguously identify maintainer groups with
expired domains, we merge disjoint groups that reference the same DNS domain,
and discard groups with references to more than one DNS name. From an initial
amount of 48,802 maintainer groups, we discard (a) 937 groups of zero size, i.e.
unreferenced mntner objects, (b) 31,586 groups without domain name references,
and (c) 4,990 groups with multiple references. The remaining 11,289 groups can
be merged to 8,441 groups by identical DNS names. We further discard groups
that do not include any hijackable resources, i.e. inetnum and aut-num objects,
which finally leads us to 7,907 object groups.
Note that the number of these groups is a lower bound: an attacker could
identify even more with access to unanonymized RIPE data. As discussed above,
4 The meta information refers to Interbusiness Network Administration Staff of Tele-
com Italia.
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Fig. 2. RIPE database objects grouped by references to a common maintainer object
(CCDF).
each of these groups is maintained by a single entity. If a group’s DNS name
expires, we consider the entity’s resources to be a valuable target for an attacker.
3.2 Refinement by Activity Measures
To confirm that a set of resources is abandoned, our approach is based on com-
plementary data sources. We start with domain names that expire, which is a
strong yet inconclusive indication for a fading resource holder. We gain further
evidence by considering only resources that are neither changed in the RIPE
database nor announced in BGP. Including both administrative (DNS, RIPE)
and an operational (BGP) measures gives a comprehensive picture on the uti-
lization of the resources.
Lifetime of Domain Names We used the whois system to query expiry dates
for all extracted DNS names (cf., Section 3.1). Figure 3 shows the distribution
of these dates. At the time of writing, 214 domain names have been expired.
Another 121 names expire within the week, given that the owners miss to re-
new their contracts. The most frequent top level domains are .com (27.9%),
.ru (21.5%), and .net (13.0%), while the most frequent expired TLDs are .ru
(20.1%), .it (16.4%), and .com (9.81%). The longest valid domains are reg-
istered until 2108 and mostly represent governmental institutions. The longest
expired domain has been unregistered for nearly 14 years. With respect to the
maintainer groups derived above, a total of 65 groups that reference expired
DNS names remain. These groups hold 773 /24 networks and 54 ASes, and are
subject to closer investigation.
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Fig. 3. Expiry dates for DNS names referenced by RIPE database objects.
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Fig. 4. RIPE database updates by maintainer group (CDF).
RIPE Database Updates For each of the 7,907 maintainer groups – divided
into 7,842 valid groups and 65 with expired DNS names – we extracted the
minimum time since the last change for any of its database objects. Note that
we filtered out automated bulk updates that affected all objects of a certain
type5. Figure 4 shows the distribution of database updates for groups with valid
and for groups with expired domain names. While about 10% of the valid groups
5 For instance, RIPE added a new status attribute to all aut-num objects on 27 May,
2014.
show changes within two months, DNS-expired groups differ strikingly: the 10%-
quantile is at nearly 5 months. Hence, given these long times without updates,
we consider resource groups that exhibit an object update within 6 months to
be still maintained and not abandoned. Note that we do not assume inactivity
in absence of such changes.
BGP Activity To confirm inactivity, we correlate the RIPE database updates
with activities in the global routing system. For that, we analyze all available
BGP update messages from the RouteViews Oregon’s feed for the same time
frame. This data set comprises 83,255 files with 18.4 billion announcements and
1.04 billion withdraw messages for resources assigned by RIPE. Given this data,
we are able to extract two indicators: (1) the time since an IP prefix was last
visible from the RouteViews monitor, and (2) the time since the last deployment
of a RIPE-registered AS number by looking at AS path attributes. Figure 5
shows the distribution of last activity in BGP for any Internet resource in our
maintainer groups. Nearly 90% of resources in valid groups are visible in BGP at
the moment. Surprisingly, most of the remaining groups did not show any activity
at all during the last 2.5 years. About 75% of the DNS-expired resources are
present in today’s routing table – and are thus still actively used. The remaining
resources did show some activity in the past (10%) or were never observed in
BGP during our analysis period (15%).
These findings confirm our assumption that inactivity in the RIPE database
does not necessarily imply operational shutdown. While up to 85% of the expired
resources were seen in BGP within the last 2.5 years, Figure 4 indicates that not
more than 55% of the expired resources received an update in the RIPE database.
We further learn that some expired resources did show BGP activity in the past,
and do not show any activity today. Note that we disregard resources with recent
BGP activity. These resources could potentially be hijacked already; however,
attacks that started before our analysis are beyond the scope of our approach.
3.3 Hijackable Resources
So far, we learned that 65 maintainer groups with a total of 773 /24 networks
and 54 ASes reference expired DNS names. Our activity measures further indi-
cate that valid groups yield higher activity than expired groups. By combining
these measures, we are able to infer resources that are inactive from both an
administrative and an operational point of view. Figure 6 shows the time since
the latest change by any of these measures, i.e., the minimum value of both
measures.
This combined activity measure clearly splits the 65 expired maintainer
groups into two disjoint sets: 52 cases were active within the last 3 months,
while 13 cases did not show any activity for more than 6 months. We consider
these remaining 13 cases to be effectively abandoned. These resource groups
represent a total number of 15 inetnum objects (with an equivalent of 73 /24
networks) and 7 aut-num (i.e., AS number) objects.
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Fig. 5. BGP update messages observed by maintainer group (CDF).
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Fig. 6. Combined RIPE/BGP activity by maintainer group (CDF).
Now that we have identified vulnerable resources, we feel obliged to protect
these resources. Since any attacker could repeat our analysis, we are going to
contact endangered resource holders before publishing our findings. Although
communication via e-mail is futile due to expired domains, we can fall back on
telephone numbers provided in the RIPE database to reach out for the operators.
4 Research Agenda
For the problem of abandoned Internet resources, one might argue that the
threat is not caused by a technical but a social problem because operators agree
to their peering relations based on a weak authentication scheme. This scheme
can be replaced by stronger verification – the required data already exists. RIRs
have contracts with the owners of delegated resources and thus are aware of more
reliable contact points (e.g., telephone numbers). However, the current situation
shows that we need mechanisms, tools, and procedures which are not tedious
for operators but allow for easy resource verification. Our approach to identify
abandoned resources can be easily extended to continuously monitor resources
of all RIRs. This would allow us to warn network operators about potential
risks. Finding scalable approaches to implement early warning and prevention
in real-time, though, is an open research issue.
4.1 Limitations of Related Work
Current research is particularly focused on the detection of BGP hijacking at-
tacks. Proposed mitigation techniques look on the control plane, the data plane,
or both. Control plane monitoring is used to identify anomalies in BGP routing
tables to infer attacks [9,1,14,21,6]. Such approaches are prone to false posi-
tives due to legitimate causes for anomalies. Techniques based on data plane
measurements account for changes of the router topology [23,22], or of hosts in
supposedly hijacked networks [5,4,18]. These approaches rely on measurements
carried out before and during an attack. Beyond that, studies on the malicious
intent behind hijacking attacks exist [15,19,17,20].
All detection approaches require the observation of suspicious routing changes.
Attacks based on our attacker model take place outside the routing system, and
thus do not lead to noticeable routing changes – apart from a supposedly le-
gitimized organisation starting to reuse its Internet resources. Hence, current
detection systems are incapable to deal with this kind of attack.
The DNS has been widely studied in the context of malicious network activ-
ities, mainly concerning spammers or fraud websites. Proactive blacklisting of
domain names [3] does not help in our scenario as the threat is effective on the
routing layer. Identifying orphaned DNS servers [7] is also out of scope of this
paper as the attacker does not leverage the DNS server but the expiring domain.
4.2 Resource Ownership Validation
Despite its effectiveness, we consider our approach to detect and monitor aban-
doned resources as outlined above an intermediate solution only. In fact, we
argue that there is a need for resource ownership validation.
There is ongoing effort to increase the deployment of a Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [11]. In its present state, the RPKI allows for validation of
route origins by using cryptographically secured bindings between AS numbers
and IP prefixes. This mechanism prevents common hijacking attacks. In terms of
hijacking abandoned resources, however, this system is ineffective in its current
form since the abandoned origin AS is taken over as well, and origin validation
performed by BGP routers [13] will indicate a valid BGP update.
Even though the RPKI itself can be misused [2], at the moment it represents
the only mechanism for proofing securely ownership of Internet resources. We
merely lack a clear procedure in the context of abandoned Internet resources.
One approach could be the following operational rule: a peering request is only
established when resource objects of the requesting peer exist in the RPKI.
Recent time stamps for these objects indicate that the requesting peer has control
over the resources as only authorized users can create such objects. Such a scheme
seems feasible from the operational perspective and might even increase the
incentives to deploy RPKI.
RPKI is part of BGPsec, an even larger effort to secure BGP. This extension
to the protocol remedies the risk of hijacking abandoned resources due to its path
validation capabilities: in our model, an attacker cannot provide valid crypto-
graphic keys to sign update messages as specified by BGPsec [10]. However, the
development of BGPsec is at an early stage, and the benefit compared to pure
origin validation is questionable in particular in sparse deployment scenarios [12].
Future research should be carried out on enabling Internet service providers
to validate resource ownership of customers. We see the potential of such a
system not only in preventing attackers from hijacking abandoned Internet re-
sources. It would also establish trust in customer-provider and peer-to-peer re-
lationships, as well as in resource transfers issued by RIRs or LIRs.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by a real-world case study, we introduced a generalized attacker model
that is aimed on the hijacking of abandoned Internet resources. We showed that
such an attack is feasible with little effort, and effectively hides the attacker’s
identity by acting on behalf of a victim. By studying orthogonal data sources
over a period of more than 30 months, we could give evidence of a high risk
potential of such attacks. Only in the European RIR database, we found 214
expired domain names that control a total of 773 /24 networks and 54 ASes, all
of which can be easily hijacked. About 90% of these resources are still in use,
which enables an attacker to disrupt operational networks. The remaining 10%
of the resources are fully abandoned, and ready to be stealthily abused.
Our findings led us to the conclusion that state-of-the-art systems are limited
to deal with this kind of attack. More importantly, we argued that there is a
need for resource origin validation. Such a framework would not only prevent
attacks, but could also strengthen today’s Internet eco-system by establishing
trust in resource ownership.
Ethical Considerations In this paper, we sketched a new attack vector. Up
until now, it is unclear how common such attacks are; our findings thus might
trigger new malicious activities. However, we also showed that this attack is
already known to attackers, and we sketched countermeasures to mitigate this
concern. In addition, we contact the holders of vulnerable resources before pub-
lication of our findings.
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